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Summary Notes of the Center for Contemporary Conflict 
 Conference on WMD Proliferation in the Middle East: Directions 
and Policy Options in the New Century 
 
 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 




Sixty academic, policy, and intelligence 
community professionals from around 
the world met at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California from June 28-30 to take an 
in-depth and systematic look at the 
proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) in the Middle East 
region and policy conundrums facing 
the United States and the international 
community in combating this problem. 
The conference specifically addressed 
the status of WMD programs in Iran, Syria, Libya and the potential for WMD proliferation in 
Saudi Arabia. Coupled with this country-specific and regional focus, topics of discussion 
included a review of the contemporary threat environment; current proliferation policy 
parameters, including supply and demand policy issues; an analysis of different ideas for 
threat reduction on a country-specific and region-wide basis; and an examination of strategies 
available to the United States and the international community to address these programs. 
The resulting interaction between the participants and assembled experts proved invaluable in 
helping the conference to further the collective understanding WMD proliferation in the Middle 
East and the policy options available to address the issue. 
 
 
Regional Overview and Individual Country Cases 
 
The first panel focused on proliferation, asymmetric war and the contemporary threat 
environment in the region, including a look at Israeli threat perceptions after regime change in 
Iraq.  
 
Dr. Stephen Blank of the Army War College argued that in order to fully grasp the nature of 
existing and developing strategic threats we must reconsider the regional threat environment, 
which has transformed itself with new actors employing asymmetric threats and strategies. 
Three key points emerged from the discussion. States increasingly are relying on WMD as a 
component of political and military strategies. Secondly, as technologies become more 
advanced and accessible the threats from regional non-state actors increases. Thirdly, in this 
environment, intelligence collection, operations and capabilities combined with information 
dominance become critical to US WMD counter-proliferation strategy. “Traditional” threat 
assessments are inadequate to the task at hand. Information about threats is not enough. 
Participants generally agreed that the United States must improve its capability for assessment 
and understanding of the implications of threats stemming from a variety of proliferating 
capabilities, such as missiles, chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological and cyber. 
 
Dr. Avner Cohen of the University of Maryland discussed current Israeli threat perceptions 
after Operation Iraqi Freedom. Cohen argued that historically Israel’s nuclear capability has 
not been a central issue in its politics.  It has not used its nuclear arsenal to compel any state 
to action, and only sees its nuclear force as a deterrent that guarantees Israel’s survival. Israel 
will consider any regional state with emerging or extant WMD capabilities a direct or existential 
threat. Participants discussed the threat from Iran’s WMD program, and Cohen argued that the 
Iranian programs very existence poses a threat to Israel. Most participants agreed that Iran 
will continue to support terrorism, but some argued that Iran would probably not provide 
WMD to terrorists, and would try to create an aura of calculated ambiguity surrounding its 
nuclear program.  The dilemma now facing Israel is that it has a vested interest in retaining its 
nuclear capability for deterrence and an overall interest in devaluing WMD throughout the 
region.  The problem is that Israel’s nuclear program is in itself a motivating factor in the 
desire of other states to acquire WMD.  Participants concluded that it is important, particularly 






Another panel focused entirely on Iran. Dr. Ray Takeyh from the National Defense University 
presented his perspective on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Takeyh argued that Iran’s desire for 
nuclear weapons is based on practical, defensive needs as opposed to ideological reasons such 
as an “Islamic bomb.”  In this respect, according to Takeyh, Iran’s desires are the same as 
Israel’s in that they want them for a deterrent effect, but that Israel is not the reason for 
Iran’s nuclear program.  Iran’s motivations stem from nationalistic and cultural factors, as well 
as a desire to be seen as a dominant regional power, according to Takeyh. Some participants 
disagreed with Takeyh, contending that Israel is a factor in Iran’s continued nuclear program 
development. Additionally Iran’s tactics related to the attention focused towards its program 
reflect a tendency to play the “pity card” in the international community.  The state is 
controlling IAEA inspections and access to information related to its program.  Takeyh noted 
that that Iranians believe a democratic Iraq will have more divisions and internal problems, 
which will lead to a weak central government that will be less threatening to Iran.  In the post-
9/11 environment, Iran finds itself in a paradox.  The threat from Iraq has decreased since 
Hussein’s removal. Likewise, strikes in Afghanistan have removed the Taliban, and Iran has 
begun improved relations with President Hamid Karzai.  Despite all this, the perception by 
Iranian policy-makers is that their security has decreased. 
 
This panel also included a discussion about Iranian threat perceptions and policy options. Greg 
Giles from SAIC described Iran’s motivations for developing it nuclear program, and the 
internal divisions within Iran over the program’s direction. Mr. Giles also presented possible 
U.S. policy options in a worst-case scenario. These included continued coercive ambiguity, U.S. 
military action, invasion, and building a case in the international community for more heavy-
handed tactics against Iran. Participants generally agreed that all of these options must be 
done in parallel with continued pressure from the IAEA and the international community.   
 
Discussion following the presentations conceded that an inverse relationship exists between 
the United States and Iran.  The number of carrots the United States is willing to offer Iran is 
decreasing while the number Iran wants is increasing.  This polarizing in stances has 
decreased overlap in potential 
negotiated outcomes. Some 
participants speculated that Iran 
will try to get as much mileage 
out of the NPT as possible, and 
when it no longer can it will 
withdraw from it altogether, and 
then declare and test a nuclear 
weapon.  The lively discussion 
left many questions unanswered. 
Conversations continued well into 
the break. A key question was 
raised, assuming Iran already has 
nuclear weapons, what steps 
should the US take in the Gulf, 
Iran, and other places to deal 
with the situation?  Much debate 
centered on the idea that it was easier to manage a friend’s WMD program than it is to stop or 
contain an enemy’s. 




The panel on Syria focused on Syrian WMD programs, as well as threat perceptions and 
strategic objectives. Dr. Ahmed Hashim from the Naval War College discussed the priorities 
and options for a Syrian WMD program. Hashim argued that Syrian WMD programs need to be 
seen in the context of Arab historical conventional military weakness, both a cause and effect 
of the Arab defeat in the 1967 War. A weak Syria benefits Israel. Since Syria aims to deter a 
continually stronger and nuclear-armed Israel, it is difficult for U.S. policy to impact 
Damascus’s calculations. Additionally, the opacity of the environment makes developing 
strategy and policy problematic.  
 
Dr. Murhaf Jouejati from George Washington University discussed Syria’s threat perception 
and strategic objectives. Jouejati contended that Syria’s WMD program must be dealt with at 
the state level, while also simultaneously taking steps to integrate Syria globally.  Syria’s WMD 
program is a response to Israel’s nuclear program and its seemingly invincible conventional 
military forces.  Syria’s strategic objectives are to contain Israel within its 1967 boundaries and 
to establish an eastern Arab front against Israel. Participants added that Syria’s threat 
perceptions are shaped by the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and a NATO member (Turkey) 
along its northern border. For Syria, a WMD program establishes security in this precarious 
environment. Jouejati made an important point from the Arab perspective, stating that if the 
al-Assad regime bowed to US pressure to rid itself of WMD, it would lose what little internal 
legitimacy it has left.  Thus, Syria’s WMD programs must also be seen in the context of a 




The panel on Saudi Arabia focused 
on Saudi Arabia’s strategic 
problems and the issue of nuclear 
weapons in Saudi developing 
security calculus. 
 
James Russell from the Naval 
Postgraduate School presented an 
argument that the strategic 
problems facing Saudi Arabia are 
causing it to consider acquisition of 
nuclear capabilities in the context 
of upgrading and/or replacing its 
CSS-2 missiles bought from China 
in the late 1980s.  Russell outlined 
a set of changing strategic 
circumstances, which are 
combining to bring the issue of 
nuclear and/or WMD proliferation into play in Riyadh.  First, the U.S. relationship upon which 
Saudi Arabia’s security has been founded is in an uncertain state.  Second, the region 
environment is becoming more threatening due to Iran’s nuclear aspirations and the prospect 
of a Shi’a-dominated state in Iraq. Third, internal politics in Saudi Arabia complicate and 
reduce the maneuver room available to the royal family in addressing its security conundrums.  
A decision by Saudi Arabia to go nuclear would cause a cascade of regional proliferation. 
Potential internal instability within the Kingdom also makes Saudi Arabia a particularly 
dangerous proliferation case. Rumors of Saudi involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear program, in 
addition to the existing relationship with China through the CSS-2 program are all suggestive 
of an interest in nuclear capabilities. Finally, U.S. policy options appear limited—the United 
Stated cannot push Saudi Arabia too far away or hold it too close. Discussions of the issue 
raised the question, “Are Saudi nuclear noises used as a means to ensure U.S. engagement?” 
 
Dr. Glenn Segell from the Institute of Security Policy in London made the point that Saudi 
Arabia would be willing to agree to a Nuclear Free Zone, but that no regional agreement on 
WMD proliferation is on the horizon.  He also discussed the role of the House of Saud in 
strategic discussions.  He stressed the importance of the fact that Saudi Arabia and its 
neighbors are not at ease with each other nor is there a clear succession in the House of Saud.  
Segell argued that the Saudi nuclear conundrum rests on the following considerations: 
struggling arms control approaches by states within the region and by the global arms control 
regime; the geo-political location of Saudi Arabia; such location vis-à-vis American military 
forces; the ability of Saudi Arabia to deliver and target nuclear weapons should it acquire it; 
the ability of America to negate such nuclear capability; the positive steps that Saudi Arabia 
has taken towards the NPT Treaty and a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone; the apprehensions of 
slow progress towards biological and chemical weapons prevention in the Middle East; the 
domestic vulnerability of the House of Saud; the threat of the Saudi State to global stability 
through the relevance of oil; and specific scenarios/actions that need to be considered should 
Saudi decided to acquire nuclear weapons. Discussion generated the question: Could a NATO-
like custody agreement in the region be permissible under the NPT? Additionally participants 
argued that the House of Saud will be supported and maintained because it provides a 
semblance of security in the region, and is therefore not in danger.  In addition, a democratic 
regime in Saudi Arabia likely could be anti-U.S., so the United States and others have vested 
interests in maintaining the regime. 
 
 
Libya and Iraq 
 
The final country-specific panel 
focused on Libya and Iraq. It 
compared the cases of Libya and Iraq 
in the context of coercive diplomacy. 
Dr. Robert Litwak from the Woodrow 
Wilson Center presented his view of 
the two alternative nonproliferation 
models which were manifested in 
these 2003 cases: in Iraq, a change of 
regime; in Libya, a change in a 
regime. Litwak emphasized that the 
Iraq and Libya cases set important 
nonproliferation precedents and proposed that the case of Libya indicates that reintegration is 
possible—though Qaddafi’s assassination antics also identify limitations.  Discussion focused on 
regime change which participants agreed must be viewed carefully. Litwak asserted that type 
of regime does not affect proliferation as much as regime intent. The open questions remained 
during further discussion whether the United States could win multilateral support for punitive 
measures in the event of Iranian non-compliance and whether the Tehran regime, as a 
member of the “axis of evil,” would find credible a U.S. assurance of regime survival. 
 
Dr. Wyn Bowen from the Joint Service Command and Staff College, U.K. specifically addressed 
the case of Libya, pre- and post-December 2003. Bowen presented a study comparing what 
was known about the country’s nuclear program through open sources prior to December 
2003, with the information that has since entered the public domain. Bowen concluded that, 
even in relatively closed and non-transparent societies, open sources can provide useful 
insights into the political, strategic and economic context in which national decisions are taken 
on nuclear-related issues in both the civil and military sectors. Bowen also concluded, 
however, that while it is possible to generate pertinent information on legitimate ‘civil’ 
capabilities and activities that may underlie a nuclear weapons program, most key 
proliferation-relevant transfers and activities are likely to be buried too deeply and therefore 
beyond the scope of open sources. On-site verification and unrestricted access to all 
potentially relevant sites are the only ways to reach conclusive assessments of peaceful intent 
in the nuclear or broader WMD fields.  
 
Current Proliferation Policy Parameters 
 
Additional panels addressed policy issues including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
and the regional proliferation landscape. Dr. David Cooper from the Nonproliferation Office of 
the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense discussed the proliferation policy parameters of 
the PSI initiative.  Cooper argued that interdiction must be enhanced. The PSI serves as a 
deterrent but there must still be plans to directly combat those who illegally proliferate WMD 
and related technologies. Better, more focused analytical frameworks and threat identification 
is required. Further discussion centered on the dilemma posed by the threat of use of force 
against proliferators enhancing U.S. options: will it dissuade adversaries or amplify the security 
dilemma? 
 
Mr. Michael Friend, a research 
fellow at the United Nations 
Institute for Disarmament 
Research, discussed the topic 
of counterproliferation vs. 
nonproliferation in the Middle 
East after the removal of 
Saddam Hussein. Friend 
evaluated how well the U.S. 
“comprehensive 
nonproliferation strategy” is 
working, and what lessons 
can be drawn for policy in the 
cases of Syria and Iran. 
Strategic policy and control 
operations are difficult to 
formulate because of the 
malleability of WMD. Friend 
argued that counterproliferation efforts stand to gain effectiveness and legitimacy if the United 
States acts to strengthen multilateral nonproliferation instruments.  Traditional nonproliferation 
has not failed, but it does need serious attention from the international community.  
 
Supply and Demand Policy Issues  
 
Another panel addressed supply and demand policy issues. Mr. Christopher Clary presented a 
dynamic brief on the A. Q. Khan network, a timely issue which had come up several times 
already in previous discussions. Clary stated that A.Q. Khan network represented the first time 
in history all of the difficult components of a nuclear weapon program were outside of state 
control. Clary argued that new WMD proliferants are uniquely prone to secondary proliferation 
and that, as was the case with Pakistan, bureaucratic conflict can determine the timetable, 
type, and size for nuclear acquisition and proliferation.  The global diffusion of WMD 
information and the globalization of manufacturing have reduced the effectiveness of supplier 
regimes.  
 
Dr. Michael Kraig of the Stanley Foundation addressed demand-side policy options, and argued 
that security architectures are necessary in the Middle East to constrain regional threats, the 
primary drivers of proliferation.  Kraig discussed ways of structuring different security 
institutions, ensuring they worked with existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements, and 
bringing difficult parties to such discussions. 
 
The last panel concentrated on country-specific and region-wide threat reduction as well as 




Threat Reduction and the Middle East  
 
Dr. Peter Lavoy from the Naval Postgraduate 
School discussed how effective the United 
States has been in influencing the 
motivations for WMD proliferation in the 
Middle East and Asia. Lavoy argued that we 
need a comprehensive WMD proliferation 
influence (i.e. threat reduction) strategy 
which includes allies, friends, neutrals, 
adversaries, and new WMD-armed states and 
consists of counterproliferation, 
nonproliferation, security cooperation, and 
arms control. Counterproliferation efforts will 
gain effectiveness by strengthening 
multilateral nonproliferation instruments. 
Lavoy added that supply-side policies are 
necessary but insufficient, stating that the 
United States can have significant influence, 
but only if it is able to understand and 
influence nuclear myths and mythmakers.  
Discussion during this time focused in part on 
where interdiction rested in relation to U.S. 
policy.  Some believed it rested as a result of 
nonproliferation justification and enforcement 
action, others believed it was part of 
counterproliferation strategy in which it was 
the active arm of policy.  
 
Dr. Rose Gottemoeller, from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, discussed 
issues of threat reduction in the Middle East. Gottemoeller proposed that when we are 
considering the challenges of threat reduction there is an applicability of lessons elsewhere 
around the globe, particularly in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  These lessons 
can provide a model to control dangerous materials. The participants generally agreed that 
threat reduction in the region is dependent on confidence; it must be a two-way street.  
 
The conference concluded with a classified government-only session, during which some topics 
were addressed in greater depth. Participants were very satisfied with the conference and 
expressed a desire to return to the Naval Postgraduate School for more conferences which 
could address other issues on the topic of WMD proliferation.  
